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Abstract 
Attentional biases to threat are thought to arise from anxiety promoting automatic 
attentional processing in the form of hypervigilance, while disrupting voluntary 
attentional processes such as inhibitory control. There is little support for the latter 
in specific fear. The current study examined behavioural (RT and accuracy) and 
electrophysiological correlates of hypervigilance (P1 amplitude) and inhibitory 
control (N2 amplitude) in 15 high and 15 low spider fear females aged 18-40 years 
using a modified flanker go nogo task with increased cognitive load. Spider or 
flower go targets were flanked by incongruent images or neutral dashes. A central 
mushroom appeared on nogo trials, and could be flanked by either spider or flowers. 
High fears did not show faster RTs and greater P1 amplitude in response to spider 
targets as hypothesised, with both groups showing greater RTs to spider targets, and 
low fears demonstrating reduced P1 amplitude in the left hemisphere. Contrary to 
predictions, there was no fear-specific behavioural interference or reduced nogo-N2 
amplitude in high fears, but they did show increased N2 amplitude on trials with 
spider flankers. This may suggest a compensatory inhibitory mechanism in response 
to feared stimuli. However, the current paradigm may not have adequately elicited 
automatic attentional processing or fear responses.  
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 Attentional bias to threat occurs when selective attention is preferentially 
allocated to threatening compared to neutral stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010). This bias 
has been consistently observed in individuals with high anxiety levels, and in a 
range of clinical anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). While thought to be 
involved in the etiology and maintenance of clinical anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2002; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014), the exact mechanisms underlying attentional 
bias to threat remain unclear (Cisler & Koster, 2010). The identification of such 
mechanisms is useful for further development of clinical treatment interventions 
(Van Bockstaele et al., 2014), which is of particular importance given high rates of 
relapse after treatment in anxiety disorders (Boschen, Neumann, & Waters, 2009). 
 One prominent theory proposes that attentional biases to threat arise due to 
anxiety disrupting the balance between two attentional systems (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Specifically, Attentional Control Theory (ACT) 
argues that anxiety facilitates attention to threat by promoting automatic, bottom-up 
processing associated with a posterior, stimulus-driven attentional network, while 
simultaneously decreasing voluntary, top-down control of attention (influenced by 
knowledge and expectations) associated with an anterior, goal-directed attentional 
network (Eysenck et al., 2007). ACT is based almost exclusively on research 
involving high trait anxiety participants, and currently there is a lack of clear 
evidence for this prediction in specific fear/phobia, a distinct anxiety subtype. There 
is evidence of increased automatic attentional processing of threat relative to neutral 
stimuli in specific fear, a process referred to as specific hypervigilance. However, 
the role of voluntary control processes and their interaction with automatic 
processing is much less understood. Therefore, in the present study, behavioural and 
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electrophysiological correlates of hypervigilance and inhibitory control were 
assessed in spider fear using a hybrid flanker go-nogo task. 
Attentional Networks Model  
 The attention network model (Posner & Petersen, 2012) offers a framework 
that distinguishes automatic and voluntary processes of attention. This model posits 
that an alerting, orienting and executive control network operate as anatomically and 
functionally distinct attentional systems. Furthermore, components of the orienting 
and executive control networks are synonymous with the posterior (stimulus-driven) 
and anterior (goal-directed) attentional systems referred to in ACT (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). 
 The orienting network engages prioritised processing of sensory input 
through orienting the ‘spotlight’ of attention from one location (or object) to another 
(Callejas, Lupianez, Funes, & Tudela, 2005; Derryberry & Reed, 2002). A dorsal 
fronto-parietal system within the orienting network is thought to exert rapid top-
down control over attention, allowing swift covert orienting of attention (Petersen & 
Posner, 2012). In contrast, a ventral fronto-parietal system (including the temporo-
parietal junction) is thought to be reactive to bottom-up signals arriving at the visual 
system, allowing rapid, stimulus-driven responses (Petersen & Posner, 2012).  
 The executive control network, or anterior system, directs a number of 
voluntary attentional processes that integrate higher order functions (Petersen & 
Posner, 2012). Such processes include detecting erroneous responses, monitoring 
and dealing with conflict, and inhibiting dominant responses (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002; Petersen & Posner, 2012). Anterior regions of the frontal cortex involved in 
top-down control are implicated in this network, particularly the prefrontal cortex 
and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Petersen & Posner, 2012). Recently, a dual 
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network view has been proposed where a cingulo-opercular and a frontoparietal 
system, both consisting of frontal and parietal areas, are involved in the executive 
control network (Petersen & Posner, 2012). The executive control network is 
proposed to have an interactive relationship with the orienting network, whereby it 
can regulate the allocation of attention via voluntary control (Derryberry & Reed, 
2002). Inversely, the orienting network can exert strong influence in directing 
attention, which can override attentional regulation by the executive control network 
(Fan et al., 2009).  
Attentional Bias in Spider Fear 
 High fear and clinical phobia of spiders is of high prevalence (Oosterink, de 
Jongh, & Hoogstraten, 2009). Thus, there has been much investigation into 
attentional biases in this subtype of fear/phobia. Behavioural evidence of enhanced 
automatic and reduced voluntary attentional processing of feared stimuli has been 
sought through the use of ‘facilitation’ and ‘interference’ paradigms, respectively. 
 Facilitation Effects and Hypervigilance. Facilitation effects are measured 
through enhanced behavioural performance in response to spider stimuli, and are 
interpreted to index facilitated attention to fear-relevant information. For example, in 
an object identification task, Kolassa, Musial, Mohr, Trippe, and Miltner (2005) 
found that people with spider phobia, relative to social phobia and control 
participants, were faster to identify images of spiders than birds or flowers. 
Comparable effects have been identified in dot probe tasks where participants must 
indicate whether a dot appears on the right or left side of a screen after it replaces 
either a threat related or neutral image. High relative to low spider fear participants 
have shown faster responses to dots replaced by spider compared to neutral and non-
feared threat stimuli (Lipp & Derakshan, 2005; Mogg & Bradley, 2006). These 
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findings are interpreted as evidence of specific hypervigilance (Kolassa et al., 2005), 
or the preferential allocation and narrowing of attention towards threat compared to 
neutral stimuli (Eysenck, 1992). Eysenck distinguishes this from general 
hypervigilance, which is the propensity to attend to or become distracted by any 
task-irrelevant stimulus. This has also been demonstrated in spider phobia 
participants, where they have responded more quickly to images of both flowers and 
spiders compared to control and social phobia groups (Kolassa, Musial, Kolassa, & 
Miltner, 2006). According to Michalowski et al. (2009), in fearful individuals, 
exposure to phobia-relevant cues could prompt a state of general hypervigilance in 
response to all visual information, regardless of emotional relevance. 
 Hypervigilance to threat has been linked to structures involved in emotional 
and early visual processing. The amygdala has been implicated in automatic 
processing of fear and in the detection of threat (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De 
Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003; Janak & Tye, 2015; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 
2001). Furthermore, increased activity of the amygdala has been found for high 
spider fear participants in response to both spider and threat-related images relative 
to neutral images at subliminal exposure durations (Carlsson et al., 2004). Bishop 
(2007) proposed an amygdala prefrontal circuitry where hyperactivity of the 
amygdala in response to threat, and under-recruitment of the prefrontal cortex in 
regulating this, facilitates enhanced projections to the visual cortex, biasing attention 
towards threat. In line with this, increased amygdala and visual cortex activity have 
been found to be correlated during viewing of faces depicting fear (Morris et al., 
1998). Bishop’s account is relatively concordant with ACT which alludes to 
increased activation of an orienting network and decreased activation of an 
executive control network (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Thus, 
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hypervigilance to threat in specific fear could reflect increased influence of the 
bottom-up component of the orienting network characterised by rapid and automatic 
shifting of attention, (Petersen & Posner, 2012), as facilitated by amygdala 
hyperactivity.  
 Interference Effects and Inhibitory Control. Interference paradigms have 
also been used to examine evidence of attentional bias to threat in spider fear, by 
assessing the extent to which feared but task-irrelevant stimuli affect responses to 
neutral task-relevant stimuli. In visual search tasks, high spider fear participants 
demonstrate slowed identification of neutral images when spider distractors are 
present, compared to when only neutral or non-feared threat distractors are present 
(Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli, 2008; Lipp & Waters, 2007; Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, 
Heuer, & Becker, 2005). Additionally, in emotional Stroop tasks, spider fear 
participants show slowed colour-naming latencies for spider-related relative to 
neutral words, suggesting interference where fear-relevant words are harder to 
ignore (Kwakkenbos, Becker, & Rinck, 2010; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997; Watt, 
McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986). Others have failed to replicate such 
emotional Stroop interference in spider phobia using either schematic (Kolassa, 
Musial, Kolassa, & Milter, 2006) or real spider images (Kolassa, Musial, Mohr, 
Trippe, & Miltner, 2005). This may be due to insufficient cognitive load to elicit 
interference. While previous stoop tasks with spider words each used five different 
colours, those using pictures only used two. Thus, further investigation is needed to 
determine the conditions under which interference manifests in specific fear. 
  Interference effects are thought to result from anxiety impairing attentional 
control; the top-down capacity to regulate the allocation of attention and inhibit 
bottom-up attentional influences (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Eysenck, Derakshan, 
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Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Bishop’s (2007) neurocognitive account proposes that 
hypo-activity of frontal regions plays an underlying role in this. FMRI evidence of 
this has been shown through decreased activity in ACC with increased levels of 
anxiety, and reduced activity in lateral prefrontal regions with greater expectancy of 
threat-related distractors (Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004). Again, this is 
concordant with ACT, which posits that anxiety promotes interference from threat-
related stimuli through lowering the influence of top-down processes supported by 
an anterior attentional network (Eysenck et al., 2007).  
 According to ACT, inhibitory control is a major component involved in 
attentional control (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Inhibitory control 
has been identified as a critical lower level central executive function related to the 
executive control network (Miyake et al., 2000; Petersen & Posner, 2012). This 
function has been defined by two dissociable, but highly related sub-processes: 
response inhibition, which involves withholding prepotent or dominant behavioural 
responses, and interference suppression, which involves resisting interference from 
distractors (Brydges et al., 2012). According to ACT, both sub-processes are 
impaired by anxiety in the presence of threat-related distractors (Eysenck et al., 
2007). However, ACT is based almost exclusively on research involving high trait 
anxiety participants. Additionally, support for Bishop’s (2007) neurocognitive 
account has also been primarily derived from evidence using high trait anxious 
samples. Although anxiety and specific fear both involve intense negative emotional 
states, physiological symptoms and tension, there are distinct differences between 
the two (Ohman, 2008). While anxiety is enduring, anticipatory in nature, with it’s 
source often obscure, fear is more acute, elicited in response to an identifiable 
stimulus, and typically lowers once it is no longer present (Ohman, 2008). To date, 
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research that has explicitly explored attentional control functions such as inhibitory 
control in specific fear/phobia is scarce. Thus, current understanding of the role of 
this mechanism in attentional biases for this anxiety subgroup is limited.  
Flanker Go-Nogo Task 
 A hybrid version of a flanker go-nogo task is equipped to assess both 
hypervigilance and sub-processes of inhibitory control. The classic Eriksen and 
Eriksen (1974) flanker task requires a response to a central target (e.g., L) flanked 
by either congruent (e.g., LLLLL) or incongruent (JJLJJ) distractors on both sides. 
Typically, responses are slower for incongruent trials due to response conflict 
elicited by incompatible distractors (i.e., congruency effect), which requires 
interference suppression to overcome (Brydges et al., 2012; Fenske & Eastwood, 
2003). In a hybrid go-nogo version of this task, participants are signalled whether 
they need to make (go trial) or withhold (nogo trial) a response (Heil, Osman, 
Wiegelmann, Rolke, & Hennighausen, 2000). Repeated presentation of go trials 
induces a prepotent tendency to respond, increasing the need for response inhibition 
in nogo trials (Brydges et al., 2012; Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007).  
Activation of prefrontal cortex regions and the ACC has been found in both flanker 
and go-nogo tasks (Nee et al., 2007; Zhu, Zacks, & Slade, 2010). Furthermore, 
conflict between dominant and subdominant responses in these tasks makes them 
suitable to assess both automatic and voluntary attentional processes. Thus, this 
paradigm can be used to examine the distinct and interactive roles of inhibitory 
control and hypervigilance in attentional bias in specific fear. 
 Few studies have looked at attentional processes in spider fear using a 
flanker and/or go-nogo task. In a flanker task, Lavy, van den Hout, and Arntz (1993) 
found spider phobia participants showed hypervigilance to spider targets, but did not 
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demonstrate fear-related interference in response to neutral targets flanked by spider 
distractors at pre-treatment. However, as the images disappeared as soon as a 
response was made, the task was designed to capture avoidance from threat rather 
than interference suppression. More recently, Venettacci, Johnstone, Kirkby, and 
Matthews (2016) employed a flanker go-nogo task using schematic flower and 
spider images. Go and nogo trials were signaled by green and yellow stimulus 
strings respectively, and were presented with equal probability. Evidence of specific 
hypervigilance was found as high relative to low spider fear participants had faster 
RTs in response to spider compared to flower targets on go trials, regardless of 
congruency. However, high compared to low fears did not demonstrate greater 
interference effects in go trials in response to flower targets flanked by spiders. 
Venettacci et al. speculated that the hypervigilance found in high spider fear may 
have had a compensatory effect, enabling feared distractors to be efficiently 
processed and filtered out. Other findings have indicated reduced congruency effects 
for neutral stimuli following fear induction (Finucane, 2011) and in response to 
negative emotional words (Kanske & Kotz, 2010), suggesting that emotional arousal 
facilitates focal attention, preventing interference. This may reflect a complex 
relationship where the influence of the orienting network prevents impaired 
performance of the executive control network (Fan et al., 2009). However, this is not 
concordant with the predictions of ACT (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007) or empirical evidence that suggests anxiety differentially impacts these two 
attentional networks.  
 An issue with the task used by Venettacci, Johnstone, Kirkby, and Matthews 
(2016) was that only spiders and flowers featured on incongruent trials. If slower 
responding was found for flower targets with spider flankers compared to spider 
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targets with flower flankers, it could not be determine if this was due to interference 
from the feared distractors in the former, or hypervigilance to the feared target in the 
latter. Therefore, the present study aimed to modify the task to better distinguish 
interference from hypervigilance.  
Electrophysiological Correlates of Attention 
 ERPs represent averaged electrical brain activity recorded from the scalp that 
is time-locked to external events or stimuli (Woodman, 2010). The superior 
temporal resolution of this technique allows for precise measurement of swift 
changes in brain activity associated with early attentional processes; which are 
unobservable with behavioural measures alone (Woodman, 2010). Of particular 
relevance to the present study, the occipital P1 and frontal N2 ERP components can 
be used to examine attentional hypervigilance and inhibitory control, respectively.  
 P1 ERP Component. The P1 ERP component represents a positive peak in 
the ERP waveform, occurring approximately 100-130 milliseconds (ms) post-
stimulus (Luck, 2014). The P1 wave is greatest at occipital sites and likely originates 
in the extrastriate visual cortex (Luck, 2014). The P1 component reflects visual 
processing at an early stage and is modulated by selective attention and arousal 
states (Luck, 2014; Mangun, 1995). Therefore, P1 amplitude can serve as an index 
of automatic capture of attention towards threatening stimuli (O’Toole & Dennis, 
2012) and has been suggested to reflect a cortical mechanism related to attentional 
hypervigilance (Hofmann, Ellard, & Siegle, 2012), consistent with rapid shifting of 
attention associated with the orienting attentional network (Petersen & Posner, 
2012).  
 In line with this, high relative to low trait anxiety participants have shown 
greater P1 amplitude to targets presented at the same location of threatening relative 
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to non-threatening images in a cue-target paradigm (Li, Li, & Luo, 2005). Studies 
have also found enhanced P1 amplitude in spider phobia groups compared to 
controls in response to schematic spider and flower images (Kolassa et al., 2007; 
Kolassa, Musial, Kolassa, & Miltner, 2006), and pleasant, arousing, neutral, 
unpleasant and spider-related real images (Michalowski et al., 2009). These findings 
are indicative of general cortical hypervigilance. Venettacci, Johnstone, Kirkby, and 
Matthews (2016) were the first to find evidence of specific cortical hypervigilance in 
specific fear, where high relative to low spider fear participants exhibited greater P1 
amplitude in response to spider targets compared to flower targets. This was 
accompanied by facilitated RTs for spider targets in high fear participants. This is 
therefore suggestive of an early preferential selective attentional process biased 
towards fear-relevant stimuli (Eysenck, 1992).  
 N2 ERP Component. The N2 component represents a negative shift in the 
ERP waveform which peaks 250-300 ms post-stimulus onset (Folstein & Van 
Petten, 2008). Folstein and Van Petten argue that a frontocentral anterior 
subcomponent of the N2 is associated with cognitive control, and is elicited in go-
nogo paradigms. N2 amplitude is greater on nogo relative to go trials, as they require 
overriding a prepotent response (Jodo & Kayama, 1992). Nogo-N2 is likely 
generated in the right orbitofrontal cortex; a structure thought to mediate response 
inhibition (Falkenstein, 2006). Nogo-N2 amplitude is increased when time pressure 
is enhanced (Jodo & Kayama, 1992) and when nogo trials are rarer (Nieuwenhuis, 
Yueng, van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof, 2003), both conditions that require 
greater inhibitory resources when a response must be withheld. Smaller N2 
amplitude for high relative to low false alarm rates on nogo trials (Falkenstein, 
Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999), and when a task response is not successfully 
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withheld (Schmajuk, Liotti, Busse, & Woldorff, 2006) further suggests that nogo-N2 
amplitude indexes the inhibitory resources available to override a prepotent 
response.   
 Brydges et al. (2012) employed a hybrid flanker go-nogo task using 
congruent and incongruent arrow direction strings, with go and nogo trials 
distinguished by colour. Compared to incongruent conditions, nogo conditions 
produced more frontally distributed N2 components with greater amplitude over 
frontal sites and shorter latencies. This finding, and evidence that nogo relative to go 
conditions elicit greater N2 amplitude (Jodo & Kayama, 1992), may suggest that 
nogo-N2, as an index of response inhibition, provides an optimal 
electrophysiological measure of inhibitory control as an executive control network 
function.   
 Compared to healthy controls, decreased nogo-N2 amplitude has been found 
in participants with OCD (Kim, Kim, Yoo, & Kwon, 2007) and panic disorder 
(Thomas, Gonsalvez, & Johnstone, 2014), suggestive of impaired inhibitory 
processes in these clinical groups. A reduction in N2 amplitude has been observed in 
participants with a spider or snake phobia relative to controls in response to their 
feared stimulus (Miltner et al., 2005). However, this was in a passive viewing 
paradigm where inhibitory control processes were unlikely to be recruited. Using the 
flanker go-nogo paradigm described earlier, Venettacci, Johnstone, Kirkby, and 
Matthews (2016) were the first to look at ERP measures of inhibitory control in 
specific fear. Evidence of reduced inhibitory resources to inhibit a prepotent 
response to feared stimuli was not found as high fear participants did not show a 
reduction in nogo-N2 amplitude at midline frontal sites when spiders were targets, 
as expected. However, insufficient task difficulty may have contributed to the lack 
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of both behavioural and electrophysiological evidence of reduced inhibitory control 
in high fear participants in this study.  
Load theory of attention argues that distractors will more likely cause 
interference if cognitive load is high (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). 
Further, ACT posits that anxiety especially impairs inhibitory control in the presence 
of threat distractors when task demands are greater (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & 
Calvo, 2007). Accordingly, Venettacci, Johnstone, Kirkby, and Matthews (2016) 
speculated the use of colour as a go/nogo signal may have been too simple to place 
enough cognitive demands on participants to give rise to between-group differences 
in inhibitory control. While colour processing occurs early in visual processing 
(Railo, Salminen-Vaparanta, Henriksson, Revonsuo, & Koivisto, 2012), object 
recognition occurs at a later stage of processing involving top-down processes (Bar, 
2003), and is therefore likely to recruit more cognitive resources. Exclusive use of 
flower and spider targets also meant that only two objects had to be discriminated 
and associated with a response in working memory throughout the task. Therefore, 
the present study will use a modified version of the flanker go/nogo task, designed 
to place greater demands on the executive control network.  
Rationale and Aim 
 In summary, attentional biases to threat have been identified in specific 
fear/phobia samples and implicated in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders. While there is evidence for the role of automatic attentional processes 
facilitated by the mechanism of hypervigilance, the role of voluntary attentional 
control processes underpinned by inhibitory control is less clear. Given that theory 
and empirical evidence suggests anxiety differentially affects the orienting and 
executive control attentional networks, it is important to understand the unique role 
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of inhibitory control in specific fear and to disentangle it’s dynamic relation with 
earlier attentional processes. To investigate this, the impact of spider fear on 
behavioural (RT and accuracy) and electrophysiological correlates of hypervigilance 
(P1 amplitude) and inhibitory control (nogo N2 amplitude) was assessed using a 
modified version of the flanker go-nogo task (Venettacci, Johnstone, Kirkby, & 
Matthews, 2016). To isolate behavioural interference from hypervigilance, only 
incongruent trials were used with the inclusion of trials featuring vertical dashes as 
neutral flankers to provide a baseline measure of performance free from fear-related 
stimuli. In order to increase task difficulty and thereby increase the likelihood of 
between-group differences in inhibitory control, flower and spider central target 
images were used to signal go trials, with a third central mushroom used to signal 
nogo trials. Additionally, nogo trials were presented with lower probability (0.33) in 
aim of increasing go response tendencies and the subsequent need for response 
inhibition.  
Hypotheses  
 It was hypothesised that high relative to low fear participants would have 
faster RTs in response to fear-relevant (spider) relative to neutral (flower) targets 
overall, reflecting specific behavioural hypervigilance to threat. High relative to low 
fear participants were also expected to have greater P1 amplitude in response to 
spider relative to flower targets, reflecting enhanced visual processing of feared 
stimuli, in line with specific cortical hypervigilance.    
 It was hypothesised that high relative to low fear participants would have 
slower RTs for flower targets when flanked by spiders relative to neutral dashes, 
demonstrating fear-related interference. Furthermore, it was predicted that high 
relative to low fear participants would have reduced N2 amplitude on nogo relative 
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to go trials with spider relative to flower flankers present, suggesting a reduction in 
inhibitory resources to override a prepotent response to the distracting feared go 
stimuli.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 30 females (15 high fear) aged 18-40 years old (M=23.57, 
SD=6.00). Only females were recruited to control for potential sex differences in 
cognitive processing, and given higher rates of specific fear and phobia in females 
than males (Oosterink, de Jongh, & Hoogstraten, 2009). G*Power 3.1.9.2 estimates 
indicated sample sizes of 15 per group were sufficient to detect moderate sized 
effects (f = 0.25) (alpha = .05, power = .9).  
 A total of 209 females completed the screening questionnaire. The aim was 
to recruit those with scores in the upper (17 or above) and lower (5 or below) 
quartile on the Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Watts & Sharrock, 1984). In the 
final sample, high and low fear participants’ scores fell in the 70th (14 or above) and 
40th (7 or below) percentile, respectively. Participants were either psychology 
undergraduates at the University of Tasmania (UTAS) who received course credit to 
participate, or volunteers known to the investigators or recruited via UTAS and 
social media advertisement. Four (2 high fear) of 34 participants who completed the 
experimental session were excluded from the analysis due to accuracy rates less than 
80% in at least one condition.  
 The exclusion criteria included a history of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders (other than anxiety or affective), seizure, head injury, loss of 
consciousness, serious physical conditions, current use of psychoactive medication 
(other than anti-depressants), illicit drug use within the last month, or more than 50 
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lifetime occasions, and pregnancy (see Appendix A). Potential alcohol dependence 
(scores greater than 19 on Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test; Babor, 
Higgens-Biddle, Saunders, & Monteiro, 2001), and high levels of psychological 
distress (scores greater than 30 on Kessler Psychological Distress scale; Kessler et 
al., 2002) also formed part of the exclusion criteria. However, one participant had a 
K10 score of 33. Participants were also asked to abstain from caffeine (2 hours), 
tobacco (2 hours), alcohol (24 hours) and illicit drugs prior to the session. All 
participants were right handed, except four (2 Low fear), and one participant did not 
report their handedness.  
Materials and Apparatus 
 Questionnaire Measures. The Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Watts & 
Sharrock, 1984) assesses dimensions of coping\avoidance, preoccupation, and 
vigilance in response to spiders via 43 yes/no questions (e.g., “do you worry more 
about spiders than most people?”). Ten items relating to factual knowledge about 
spiders were removed for the current study. Five items are reverse scored to avoid 
response bias. Evidence of excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.91), 
test-retest reliability (r = .94), convergent validity with measures of anxiety and 
avoidance, and the ability to distinguish phobic from non-phobic individuals has 
been found for the SPQ (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996).  
 The Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995) 
was used as a secondary measure of spider fear. Compared to the SPQ, FSQ 
explicitly assesses current functioning and is superior in capturing spider fear in the 
low fear range (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996). Eighteen items assess responsiveness 
to spiders (e.g., “if I saw a spider now, I would feel very panicky”) on a 7-point 
Likert scale where 1 = definitely not, and 7 = absolutely. Higher scores indicate 
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greater intensity of phobic symptoms. The FSQ shows excellent internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.95-0.97), test-retest reliability (r = .91), and convergent validity 
with anxiety and avoidance measures (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996). 
 The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Form Y-2 (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) 
includes 20 trait anxiety items. Respondents are required to evaluate how they feel 
generally in response to statements designed to capture worry, discomfort and stress 
(e.g., “I feel nervous and restless”) on a 4-point Likert scale where 1 = almost never, 
and 4 = almost always. Higher scores indicate greater levels of trait anxiety. Good 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.90-0.91) (Spielberger, 1983) and evidence of 
convergent validity with other anxiety inventories (e.g., Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, 
& Swinson, 1998; Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 1995) has been found for the trait 
anxiety sub-scale. State anxiety was measured using the Subjective Units of Distress 
Scale (SUDS; Wolpe, 1969) where respondents indicate their current subjective 
intensity of anxiety on a scale where 0 = no anxiety, and 100 = extreme anxiety.  
 The Kessler Psychological Distress scale (K10; Kessler et al., 2002) 
comprises ten items that assess experiences of psychological distress over the last 
four weeks (e.g., “did you feel nervous?”) on a 5-point Likert scale where 1 = all of 
the time, and 5 = none of the time. Possible scores range from 10 to 50, where a 
score above 30 indicates very high levels of psychological distress. The K10 has 
demonstrated excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.93) (Kessler et al., 
2002). 
 The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Babor, Higgins-
Biddle, Saunders, & Monteiro, 2001) includes ten items that assess alcohol 
consumption, dependence, and related problems. Six frequency questions are rated 
on a 5-point scale (e.g., ‘never’ to ‘daily or almost daily’). Two questions assessing 
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harm from drinking are rated on a 3-point scale from ‘no’ to ‘yes, during the last 
year’. Two items assess the amount of alcohol consumed in a typical session, and 
frequency of consuming an alcoholic drink. Evidence of both convergent and 
discriminative validity has been found for this scale (Bohn, Babor, & Kranzler, 
1995).  
 The Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; Wechsler, 2001) assesses 
intellectual functioning. Participants are asked to pronounce fifty irregularly spelled 
words. One point is awarded per correct response, with 50 being the maximum 
possible score. The test is ended after 12 consecutive incorrect responses. Good 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.87-0.97), test-retest reliability (r = .90-.94), 
and convergent validity with other measures of intellectual functioning has been 
found for this test (Wechsler, 2001).  
 Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS; Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990) is a single-
item measure of subjective level of sleepiness using a 9-point scale where 1 = very 
alert, and 9 = very sleepy, great effort to stay awake, fighting.  
 A Video Gaming Experience Questionnaire (VGEQ) was developed for the 
current study to assess frequency of video game play via one question. Response 
options range from 1 = never play video games, and 5 = often play video games 
(more than 5 hours a week). While psychometric properties for this questionnaire 
have not been assessed, it was administered in an attempt to test for a potential 
confound given evidence of enhanced visual attention skills in regular video gamers 
(Dye, Green, & Bavelier, 2009).  
 Flanker Go-NoGo Task. A hybrid flanker go-nogo task was presented via 
NeuroScan STIM 3.1 software. White schematic images of a spider and a flower 
adapted from Kolassa, Musial, Kolassa, and Miltner (2006) were used as fear-
19 
 
  
 
relevant and neutral stimuli, respectively. On go trials, a target (spider or flower) 
was flanked by either two incongruent images (spider or flower) or two neutral dash 
distractors on either side. On nogo trials, the central stimulus was a white schematic 
mushroom flanked by either two spiders or flowers on either side. In total, six 
stimulus combinations were used (see Figure 1). There were 90 trials for each 
condition (total of 540 trials), presented in a fully randomised order with equal 
probability over four blocks of 135 trials. For each trial, a black screen displayed a 
central fixation point for 300ms followed by the five picture string (7mm height x 
36mm length, subtending 0.80o x 4.12o of visual angle) for 250ms, with the target 
appearing in identical position to the preceding fixation point. The inter trial interval 
was varied randomly across three stimulus onset asynchronies: 1750ms, 1850ms, 
and 1950ms, in an attempt to minimise latency jitter. 
 
  a.            b.                    c.     
 
 d.                                         e.                                         f.    
 
Figure 1. Stimulus strings used in the flanker go nogo task. Flower incongruent (a), 
spider incongruent (b), flower neutral (c), spider neutral (d) were used for go 
conditions. Mushroom flower-incongruent (e) and mushroom spider-incongruent (f) 
were used for nogo conditions.  
 
 Electrophysiological (EEG) Recording. The NeuroSCAN system (Scan 4.5 
software) was used to obtain EGG recordings, using a 32-channel Quik-Cap with 
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Ag/AgCl sintered electrodes. EEG data was sampled continuously at a rate of 
1000Hz, according to the international 10-20 system of electrode placement from 32 
sites. Electrode impedance was kept below 10kΩ. Electrodes were placed on the 
outer canthi of both eyes and the upper and lower left eye to measure horizontal and 
vertical electro-oculographic (EOG) activity, and all electrodes were referenced to 
linked mastoids. During editing, continuous EEG data and behavioural data were 
merged and EEG data was filtered using a Zero-phase-shift low pass filter (30Hz, 24 
dB/Oct). To reduce the impact of eye blinks on other electrode channels, ocular 
artefact rejection was employed. Epochs were then extracted from the data from 
100ms before stimulus onset to 900ms post stimulus. Baseline correction and 
artefact rejection was then carried out with trials containing artefacts above 70 μV 
and below -70 μV rejected. The occipital P1 and frontal N2 components were 
defined as the maximum amplitude between 80-120ms and 230-390ms post stimulus 
onset respectively and were derived from grand averaged waveforms for each 
condition.  
Procedure 
 The current study was approved by the University of Tasmania Human 
Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix B). Eligible participants attended an 
experimental session of approximately two hours. Upon arrival, participants were 
given an information sheet and provided informed consent (see Appendix C). 
Participants were then asked about their alcohol, caffeine, nicotine, drug and 
prescription medication use to ensure they were still eligible (see Appendix D). The 
KSS (Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990), STAI (Spielberger, 1983), VGEQ (see Appendix 
E), and WTAR (Wechsler, 2001) were then completed. 
 Following EEG set-up, participants were seated in front of a computer screen 
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at a viewing distance of approximately 50cm to complete the flanker go/nogo task 
followed by another task that was not part of the current study, in standardised order. 
Participants were asked to indicate whether the middle target was a spider or a 
flower via a button press on go trials, and to withhold any response on nogo trials 
when the middle target was a mushroom. Instructions were given to respond as 
quickly and accurately as possible. For the first two blocks, the right forefinger was 
used to respond to spiders and the left forefinger was used to respond to flowers, 
with this response pattern reversed for the remaining two blocks. The order of right 
and left finger assignment was counterbalanced between participants. Ten practice 
trials were completed prior to commencing the first and third block. Participants 
were asked to provide SUDS ratings at the beginning of each block. Breaks were 
given between blocks to minimise fatigue effects. The session concluded with 
debriefing.   
Design and Data Analysis  
 ANOVA was chosen as the analysis for the current study, as this is the most 
conventional and parsimonious approach in ERP studies where a small number of 
electrode sites are assessed (Luck, 2014). Behavioural DVs were mean RT (ms) for 
go trials and mean accuracy (% of correct trials). The electrophysiological DVs were 
peak P1 for go trials and N2 amplitude. Analysis of the N2 component was confined 
to the midline frontal Fz site, as a preliminary analysis indicated greater N2 
amplitude at Fz compared to Cz (p<.001) and FCz (p=.001), F(1, 34)=33.27, 
p<.001, ηp2=.552, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. Analysis of the P1 component was 
confined to sites O1 and O2 as greater P1 amplitude has previously been shown in 
lateral compared to central occipital sites (e.g., Kolassa et al., 2007).  
 Addressing hypotheses relating to behavioural and cortical hypervigilance, 
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and behavioural interference, RT and accuracy to go stimuli were analysed with 
separate 2 (Group: high fear, low fear) x 2 (Target image: spider, flower) x 2 
(Flanker type: incongruent image, neutral) mixed ANOVAs, with the additional 
variable of Hemisphere (left, right) included for the P1 amplitude analysis. 
Addressing the hypothesis relating to response inhibition, separate 2 (Group: high 
fear, low fear) x 2 (Trial: go, nogo) x 2 (Flanker image: spider, flower) mixed 
ANOVAs were used to analyse accuracy and N2 amplitude.  
 Levene’s test indicated a violation of homogeneity of variance for spider and 
flower incongruent trials in accuracy analyses, and SUDs ratings in blocks 3 and 4. 
However, ANOVA is argued to be fairly robust to violation of this assumption when 
sample sizes are equal, and when the largest variance does not exceed the smallest 
by four times (Howell, 2012), which was the case in the current analysis. Only 
significant (p < .05) interactions of theoretical relevance were further investigated 
via analysis of simple effects, with Bonferroni corrections applied to keep the 
family-wise error rate at .05. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied to 
within-group effects with more than two levels to counter likely violations of 
sphericity. For omnibus ANOVAs, partial eta square represented the proportion of 
variance in a DV accounted for by the IVs, with effect sizes interpreted as 
0.01=small, 0.06=medium, 0.14=large (Cohen, 1988). However, Cohen’s d was 
used to provide a standardised measure of differences between means for pairwise 
comparisons, and was interpreted in accordance to Cohen’s (1992) guidelines 
(0.2=small, 0.5=medium, 0.8=large).   
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Results 
Demographics 
 Table 1 shows the mean age and raw scores for questionnaire measures for 
both groups. There were no significant differences between the groups on age, 
sleepiness on the day of testing (KSS), intellectual functioning (WTAR), video 
gaming experience (VGEQ), alcohol usage (AUDIT), and trait anxiety (STAI). As 
expected, high fear participants had significantly greater scores for both measures of 
spider fear (SPQ, FSQ). High fear participants also had significantly higher scores 
for psychological distress (K10) compared to low fear participants.   
Behavioural Data 
 Accuracy. Cell means are presented in Table 2. For analysis of accuracy on 
go trials, there was a main effect of Flanker type, F(1,28)=10.21, p=.003, ηp2=.267, 
with a significantly lower accuracy for incongruent image (M=93.0, SD=3.4, 
95%CI[91.2,94.8) relative to neutral flanker trials (M=94.9, SD=2.8, 
95%CI[93.4,96.4]). All other main effects and interactions were non-significant 
(ps>.05, see Table F1 Appendix F). 
For analysis of accuracy on incongruent go and nogo trials, there was a main 
effect of Trial type, F(1,28)=60.27, p<.001, ηp2=.683, with responses significantly 
more accurate for nogo trials (M=99.2, SD=0.8, 95%CI[98.8,99.6]) compared to go 
trials (M=93.0, SD=3.4, 95%CI[91.2,94.8]). There was also a significant main effect 
of Flanker image, F(1,28)=6.17, p=.019, ηp2=.180, with lower accuracy in response 
to trials with spider flankers (M=95.7, SD=2.2, 95%CI[94.5,96.8]) compared to 
those with flower flankers (M=96.5, SD=1.8, 95%CI[95.5,97.5]). Overall, high fear 
participants (M=95.1, SD=2.7, 95%CI[93.6,96.5]) were less accurate than low fear 
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participants (M=97.1, SD=2.7, 95%CI[95.7,98.5]), F(1,28)=4.28, p=.048, ηp2=.133. 
All interactions were non-significant (ps>.05, see Table F2, Appendix F). 
 
Table 1 
Mean Age and Raw Scores on Measures of Spider Fear, Sleepiness, Reading Ability, 
Video Game Usage, Alcohol Usage, Anxiety, and Psychological Distress for High 
and Low Spider Fear Groups 
 Low fear High fear    
Variable M (SD) M (SD) F(1, 28) p Cohen’s d 
Age 23.3 (5.0) 23.8 (7.0) 0.04 .84 0.1 
SPQ/33 3.9 (1.8) 18.9 (3.9) 183.89 <.001 5.0 
FSQ/126 29.1 (12.8) 96.5 (13.6) 194.58 <.001 5.1 
KSS/9 3.5 (1.6) 4.3 (1.3) 2.36 .14 0.6 
WTAR/50 109.6 (11.3) 110.2 (26.9) 0.01 .94 0.03 
VGEQ/5 2.3 (1.2) 2.5 (1.5) 0.17 .68 0.2 
AUDIT/40 4.6 (2.0) 5.6 (4.6) 0.60 .45 0.3 
STAI/80 35.8 (12.4) 39.9 (7.7) 1.21 .28 0.4 
K10/50 14.9 (5.0) 19.5 (6.1) 5.09 .03 0.8 
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Table 2 
Mean Accuracy (% correct) with SD in Parentheses and 95% Confidence Intervals 
for High and Low Fear Groups for each Stimulus Condition  
 Low Fear High Fear 
 M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI 
Go trials     
Flower Incongruent 93.6 (3.9) [91, 97] 90.7 (6.7) [88, 94] 
Flower Neutral 95.9 (4.1) [94, 98] 93.4 (4.6) [91, 96] 
Spider Incongruent 95.6 (3.2) [93, 98] 92.0 (6.0) [90, 95] 
Spider Neutral 95.9 (4.2) [94, 98] 94.4 (4.6) [92, 97] 
Nogo trials     
Flower-Incongruent 99.6 (0.7) [99, 100] 98.9 (1.1) [98, 99] 
Spider-Incongruent 99.6 (0.7) [99, 100] 98.7 (2.0) [98, 100] 
 
Reaction Time. Cell means are shown in Table 3. Analysis of go trials 
revealed a significant main effect of Target image, F(1,28)=35.42, p<.001, ηp2=.558, 
with faster RT to spider (M=526.3, SD=31.6, 95%CI[509.5,543.0]) compared to 
flower targets (M=550.4, SD=35.7, 95%CI[531.5,569.2]). However, as shown in 
Figure 2, the hypothesised Group x Target image interaction was non-significant, 
F(1,28)=1.00, p=.326, ηp2=.034, with both high and low fear participants showing 
faster RTs to spider relative to flower targets. 
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Table 3 
Mean RT (ms) with SD in Parentheses and 95% Confidence Intervals for High and 
Low Fear Groups for each Stimulus Condition  
 Low Fear High Fear 
Condition M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Flower Incongruent 556.6 (38.3) [530, 582] 587.5 (58.5) [561, 613] 
Flower Neutral 514.6 (43.5) [486, 542] 542.8 (61.4) [514, 570] 
Spider Incongruent  535.4 (31.8) [513, 557] 555.2 (50.5) [532, 577] 
Spider Neutral 495.8 (34.8) [469, 522] 518.9 (62.2) [492, 545] 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean reaction time for flower and spider targets in low and high fear 
groups (error bars represent 95% CIs).  
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Overall, responses were slower on trials with incongruent (M=558.6, 
SD=31.3, 95%CI[542.1,575.2]) compared to neutral flankers (M=518.0, SD=35.2, 
95%CI[499.4,536.6]), F(1,28)=187.77, <p.001, ηp2=.870. However, as shown in 
Figure 3, the hypothesised Group x Target image x Flanker type interaction was 
non-significant, F(1,28)=0.297, p=.590, ηp2=.010, with both groups showing slower 
RTs to trials with incongruent image flankers, that did not significantly vary for 
spider and flower targets. No other main effects or interactions were significant 
(ps>.05, see Table F1 Appendix F). 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean reaction time for flower and spider targets for incongruent image 
and neutral flanker trials in low (top) and high (bottom) fear participants (error bars 
represent 95% CIs).  
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Electrophysiological Data 
 Peak P1 Amplitude. Figures 4 and 5 show the grand mean averaged 
waveforms in response to go trials at the left (O1) and right (O2) lateral occipital 
sites for low and high fear participants, respectively. Descriptive statistics for P1 
amplitude are shown in Table 4. 
Figure 4. Grand mean averaged waveforms for low fear participants at occipital O1 
(left) and O2 (right) electrode sites for go conditions. 
 
Figure 5. Grand mean averaged waveforms for high fear participants at occipital O1 
(left) and O2 (right) sites for go conditions. 
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Table 4 
Mean P1 Amplitude (μV) at Left (O1) and Right (O2) Occipital Sites with SD in 
Parentheses and 95% Confidence Intervals for High and Low Fear Groups for Go 
Stimulus Conditions  
  Low Fear High Fear 
Hemisphere Condition M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI 
Left F Incongruent 2.3 (2.5) [0.9, 3.7] 4.1 (2.9) [2.7, 5.6] 
 F Neutral 1.7 (1.6) [0.6, 2.7] 3.1 (2.3) [2.0, 4.1] 
 S Incongruent 2.5 (2.4) [1.2, 3.9] 4.3 (2.7) [2.9, 5.7] 
 S Neutral 1.5 (1.8) [0.4, 2.6] 3.4 (2.3) [2.3, 4.5] 
Right F Incongruent 3.5 (2.7) [2.2, 4.8] 3.7 (2.3) [2.4, 5.0] 
 F Neutral 2.5 (1.8) [1.6, 3.3] 2.7 (1.3) [1.9, 3.6] 
 S Incongruent 3.6 (2.6) [2.4, 4.8] 3.8 (1.8) [2.6, 5.0] 
 S Neutral  2.6 (1.9) [1.7, 3.5] 3.0 (1.4) [2.1, 3.9] 
Note: S=spider, F=flower 
 There were non-significant main effects for both Group, F(1,28)=2.24, 
p=.146, ηp2=.074, and Target image, F(1,28)=2.78, p=.106, ηp2=.090. As Figure 6 
shows, the hypothesised Group x Target image interaction was also not significant, 
F(1,28)=0.62, p=.440, ηp2=.021, with both groups demonstrating a non-significant 
difference in P1 amplitude between spider and flower targets. 
30 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6. Mean peak P1 amplitude for flower and spider targets in low and high fear 
groups (error bars represent 95% CIs). 
 
 However, there was a significant Group x Hemisphere interaction (see 
Figure 7), F(1,28)=4.47, p=.043, ηp2=.138. Simple main effects of Hemisphere were 
analysed separately at each level of Group (α=.025, Bonferroni corrected). There 
was a simple main effect of Hemisphere for low fear participants, F(1,14)=10.22, 
p=.006, with significantly greater P1 amplitude in the right relative to left 
hemisphere, with this effect moderate in magnitude (d=0.50). In contrast, high fear 
participants did not show a significant difference in P1 amplitude in the right 
compared to the left hemisphere, F(1,14)=0.46, p=.510, d=0.19. Simple main effects 
of Group were also analysed at each level of Hemisphere (α=.025, Bonferroni 
corrected). While there was a trend towards significantly greater P1 amplitude for 
high relative to low fear participants in the left hemisphere, F(1,28)=4.53, p=.042, 
d=0.78, there were no between-group differences in the right hemisphere, 
F(1,28)=0.16, p=.693, d=0.15.  
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Figure 7. Mean peak P1 amplitude for low and high fear groups at occipital sites O1 
and O2 (error bars represent 95% CIs). 
 
The main effect of Flanker type was significant, P1 amplitude greater in 
response to incongruent (M=3.5, SD=1.5, 95%CI[2.7,4.3]) compared to neutral 
flanker trials (M=2.6, SD=1.1, 95%CI[2.0,3.2]), F(1,28)=21.96, p<.001, ηp2=.440. 
No other main effects or interactions were significant (ps<.05, see Table F1 
Appendix F). 
 Peak N2 Amplitude. Figure 8 shows the grand mean averaged 
waveforms at the midline frontal site (Fz) for high (left) and low (right) fear 
participants in response to incongruent go and nogo conditions. Inspection of the 
Figure suggests peak N2 amplitude (peaking at approx. 300-320ms) was greater for 
nogo trials compared to go trials in both groups. Descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 5.  
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Figure 8. Grand mean averaged waveforms for high (left) and low (right) fear 
groups at the midline frontal electrode site (Fz) for go incongruent image (flower, 
spider) and nogo (mushroom) conditions. 
 
Table 5 
Mean N2 Amplitude (μV) with SD in Parentheses and 95% Confidence Intervals for 
High and Low Fear Groups for Incongruent Go and Nogo Stimulus Conditions  
 Low Fear High Fear 
 M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
Go trials     
Flower Incongruent 0.3 (5.0) [-2.0, 2.6] -1.3 (3.4) [-3.5, 1.0] 
Spider Incongruent  -0.2 (4.5) [-2.4, 2.0] 0.3 (3.7) [-1.9, 2.5] 
Nogo trials     
Spider-Incongruent -3.4 (4.1) [-5.3, -1.4] -3.4  (3.4) [-5.4, -1.5] 
Flower-Incongruent -3.6 (3.9) [-5.6, -1.5] -3.2 (3.8) [-5.2, -1.1] 
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 A main effect of Trial type revealed that N2 amplitude was greater on nogo 
(M=-3.4, SD=3.8, 95%CI[-4.8,-2.0]) compared to go trials (M=-0.2, SD=3.9, 
95%CI[-1.7,1.3]), F(1,28)=80.30, p<.001, ηp2=.741. There was a trend for a Group x 
Flanker image interaction (see Figure 9), F(1,28)=3.90, p=.058, ηp2=.122. 
Bonferroni corrected (α=.025) tests of simple main effects of Flanker image were 
conducted for each group. High fear participants had significantly greater N2 
amplitude on trials with spider (M=-2.3, SD=3.1, 95%CI[-4.1,-0.6]) relative to 
flower flankers (M=-1.5, SD=3.5, 95%CI[-3.4,0.5]), F(1,14)=7.62, p=.015, d=0.27, 
with a small effect size noted. Low fear participants did not show a significant 
difference in N2 amplitude in response to spider (M=-1.5, SD=4.4, 95%CI[-4.0,0.9]) 
and flower flankers (M=-1.9, SD=4.2, 95%CI[-4.2,0.4]), F(1,14)=0.43, p=.522, 
d=0.08, with a negligible effect noted. Simple main effects of Group for each 
Flanker image (α=.025, Bonferroni corrected) High and low fear groups did not 
significantly differ in N2 amplitude in response to trials with spider, F(1, 28)=0.35, 
p=.562, d=0.21, or flower, F(1, 28)=0.10, p=.755, d=0.12, flankers.  
 
Figure 9. Mean peak N2 amplitude for low and high fear participants at frontal site 
Fz for trials with flower and spider flankers (error bars represent 95% CIs).   
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 The hypothesised Group x Trial type x Flanker image interaction was non-
significant (see Figure 10), F(1,28)=2.20, p=.150, ηp2=.073, with the greater N2 
amplitude in the high fear group for spider flankers not significantly differing 
according to Trial type. No other significant main effects or interactions were found 
(ps<.05, see Table F2 Appendix F). 
 
Figure 10. Mean peak N2 amplitude for low and high fear participants at Fz for 
flower and spider flankers in incongruent image nogo (top) and go (bottom) 
conditions (error bars represent 95% CIs).  
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SUDS 
 A 2 (Group: high fear, low fear) x 4 (SUDS rating block: one, two, three, 
four) mixed ANOVA was conducted on participants’ SUDS ratings. Cell means are 
shown in Table 6. The main effect of Group was non-significant, F(1,28)=1.21, 
p=.281, ηp2=.041, as was the main effect of SUDS rating block, F(2, 47)=2.93, 
p=.072, ηp2=.095, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, and the Group x SUDS rating 
block interaction, F(2, 47)=2.45, p=.106, ηp2=.080, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. 
 
Table 6 
Mean SUDs Ratings for each Task Block with SD in Parentheses and 95% 
Confidence Intervals for Low and High Fear Groups 
                                        Low Fear                                             High Fear 
SUDs Block M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI 
One 4.0 (7.1) [0.3, 7.7] 3.7 (6.9) [-0.1, 7.4] 
Two 5.7 (8.2) [0.8, 10.6]  7.7 (10.2)  [2.8, 12.6] 
Three 4.7 (5.2) [-1.7, 11.1]     10.3 (16.3)  [3.9, 16.7] 
Four 4.3 (6.2) [-1.5, 10.1]     11.0 (14.2)  [5.2, 16.8] 
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Discussion 
 The aim of the present study was to further investigate the role of 
hypervigilance and inhibitory control in specific fear using a task with greater 
cognitive load. The hypotheses that high relative to low spider fear participants 
would demonstrate specific hypervigilance through faster RTs and greater P1 
amplitude in response to spider relative to flower targets on go trials were not 
supported. Behaviourally, all participants, regardless of fear status and flanker type, 
were faster to respond to spider targets than flower targets. Electrophysiologically, 
the absence of a significant Group x Target interaction indicated neither high or low 
fear groups showed significant differences in P1 amplitude in response to spider and 
flower targets, with the only between-group difference being significantly less P1 
amplitude in the left relative to right hemisphere for low relative to high fear 
participants.  
 The hypothesis that high relative to low fear participants would demonstrate 
behavioural interference through slower RTs in response to flower targets flanked 
by spider distractors as compared to flower targets flanked by neutral dashes was not 
supported. While the Flanker type x Group x Target interaction was non-significant, 
overall, RTs were slower in response to incongruent relative to neutral flanker trials 
for both groups, regardless of whether the trial was spider or flower incongruent. 
The hypothesis that high relative to low fear participants would have reduced N2 
amplitude for spider relative to flower flankers in nogo relative to go trials, as 
evidence of reduced inhibitory control, was also not supported. However, there was 
an unanticipated increase in N2 amplitude in response to trials with spider flankers 
for the high but not the low fear group that trended towards significance. This effect 
did not differ for nogo or go trials overall. 
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 There was no evidence for a speed-accuracy trade-off in the behavioural 
data, as there were no Target image effects on accuracy for the go analysis. Both 
lower accuracy and longer RTs were observed for incongruent trials, suggesting 
unanimous decline in both measures of performance. 
Hypervigilance to Feared Stimuli 
 The finding of faster RTs to spider targets in both groups diverges from 
previous research. Facilitated RTs to spider relative to neutral images specifically in 
individuals with a high fear/phobia of spiders relative to controls has been shown in 
picture identification (Kolassa, Musial, Mohr, Trippe, & Milner, 2005) and dot 
probe tasks (Lipp & Derakshan, 2005), and a previous flanker go nogo task 
(Venettacci, Johnstone, Kirkby, & Matthews, 2016). These findings have been 
interpreted in accordance to theory proposed by Eysenck (1992) which suggests this 
process represents a rapid narrowing of attention to threatening stimuli in high 
anxiety individuals (Kolassa et al., 2005; Venettacci et al., 2016). The current 
finding may indicate an evolutionary attentional mechanism in response to 
potentially dangerous stimuli was evoked in both high and low fear individuals 
rather than the expected fear-specific response in the high fear group. Ohman and 
Mineka (2001) proposed a neural-based fear module organised around the amygdala 
that is automatically activated in response to evolutionarily-relevant fear stimuli 
associated with threat. Evidence for this has been shown by healthy participants 
exhibiting faster responses to evolutionary-relevant threats (i.e., snakes, spiders) 
compared to fear-irrelevant objects (Blanchette, 2006).  
 The finding of no differences between groups for P1 amplitude across target 
images also does not provide support for specific hypervigilance. This is in contrast 
to a recent finding of increased P1 amplitude for high relative to low fear 
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participants specifically in response to spider relative to flower targets (Venettacci, 
Johnstone, Kirkby, & Matthews, 2016). The present finding is also not in line with 
previous evidence of general hypervigilance where spider phobia participants 
relative to controls have shown greater P1 amplitude for both neutral and spider 
images (e.g., Kolassa et al., 2007), and does not reconcile with behavioural evidence 
of a potential evolutionary attentional mechanism. Thus, P1 data does not support a 
cortical mechanism related to early automatic capture of attention in fearful 
individuals or towards feared stimuli (Hofmann, Ellard, & Siegle, 2012) supported 
by the bottom-up component of the orienting attentional network (Petersen & 
Posner, 2012). 
 The P1 finding of reduced amplitude in the left occipital site in low relative 
to high fear participants was unanticipated. It is possible that this reflects group 
differences in processing of the task stimuli. Evidence of hemispheric asymmetry in 
visual processing has indicated global processing of visual information as a whole 
and local processing for the independent features for a visual scene is dominant for 
the right and left visual cortex, respectively (Christie et al., 2012; Hellige, 1996). 
Both local and global visual processing has been found to modulate the P1 
component (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Han, He, Yund, & Woods, 2001). Studies have 
found an association between trait anxiety and a bias towards using local visual 
processing (Basso, Schefft, Ris, & Dember, 1996; Derryberry & Reed, 1998). In the 
current study, high but not low fear participants were overall less accurate to go and 
nogo trials where incongruent flankers featured and showed a difference in N2 
amplitude for spider relative to flower flankers. Accordingly, the reduction in P1 
amplitude for the left hemisphere in low fear participants may reflect differential 
engagement in local processing of distractors throughout the task that varied 
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according to fear status.  
 Taken together, behavioural and electrophysiological findings for the 
hypervigilance hypotheses do not provide support for predictions made by ACT in 
specific fear. According to ACT, anxiety stimulates a stimulus-driven attentional 
network that resembles the bottom-up component of the orienting network proposed 
by Petersen and Posner (2012), serving to facilitate attentional bias to threat 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Venettacci, Johnstone, Kirkby, and 
Matthews (2016) were the first to find behavioural and electrophysiological 
evidence of this in the form of specific hypervigilance in specific fear, which 
suggested attentional bias to feared stimuli in specific fear/phobia is underpinned by 
early attentional selections. The finding provided original empirical support for a 
possible role of this mechanism in the etiology and maintenance of specific 
fear/phobia, which could potentially be targeted in treatment interventions. 
However, using a modified flanker go nogo task designed to increase cognitive load, 
the finding was not replicated. This may indicate that this it is not robust and that 
specific hypervigilance may not be a critical characteristic of specific fear/phobia.  
 An alternative explanation for the absence of specific hypervigilance in high 
fear participants may be that cognitive load associated with the modified task 
induced interference effects that masked facilitation effects. Facilitation effects have 
typically been observed in paradigms with low cognitive load such as picture 
identification (Kolassa, Musial, Mohr, Trippe, & Milner, 2005), and dot probe tasks 
(Mogg & Bradley, 2006). A recent study used an Attention Network Test where 
preceding invalid visual spatial cues are argued to increase cognitive load in a 
flanker task (Flynn, 2015). High relative to low spider fear participants did not show 
hypervigilance through facilitated RTs or enhanced P1 amplitude following valid 
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spider cues. However, interference effects were found for high fear participants on 
incongruent flanker trials proceeded by spider cues. In the present study, it is 
possible that increased demands on the executive control network and use of 
incongruent trials only (i.e., the need to ignore incompatible flankers on every trial), 
required disproportionate engagement of voluntary attentional processing which 
limited the ability to capture differences in stimulus driven processing between the 
groups. This may help to explain the reduced accuracy on incongruent go and nogo 
trials (indicative of interference) coupled with a lack of evidence of hypervigilance 
in the high fear group. Possibly, the contrast between neutral and incongruent 
flankers may have enhanced the difficulty of the latter, as the overall reduction in 
accuracy for these trials may indicate. Future research could explore this by 
removing neutral dash flanker trials and re-including congruent trials in a similar 
paradigm with more objects to increase cognitive load to further examine whether 
evidence of both increased stimulus-driven and decreased goal-directed attentional 
processing can be found in specific fear.   
 It is also possible that the lack of hypervigilance was due to the current 
paradigm not adequately eliciting fear responses in high fear participants. While the 
groups differed significantly on measures of spider fear, with very large effect sizes 
noted, the groups did not differ in state anxiety (measured via SUDS) during the task 
at any of the four blocks. Additionally, follow-up bivariate correlation analyses (not 
reported) revealed no significant relationship between SPQ scores and RT or P1 
amplitude for spider targets among high or low fear participants. It is possible that 
the increased cognitive load in the current paradigm contributed to this. For 
example, Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, and Grillon (2012) found anxiety was reduced 
during a high relative to low load task. Future research could aim to overcome this 
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by using real spider images, which would more closely resemble the feared stimulus 
and likely elicit greater fear. Additionally, the sample used in the current study was 
not explicitly clinically defined. Thus, the overall level of intensity of fear symptoms 
may not have been sufficient to yield hypervigilance effects in the current task. 
Thus, future research should aim to use a clinical sample. 
Interference and Inhibitory Control 
 Fear-related behavioural interference in high fear participants was not 
observed. In emotional Stroop tasks, slower colour-naming latencies have been 
found in response to spider-related words in paradigms using five colours (e.g., 
Kwakkenbos, Becker, & Rinck, 2010), but not in response to real images of spiders 
where only two colours were used (Kolassa, Musial, Kolassa, & Miltner, 2006; 
Kolassa, Musial, Mohr, Trippe, & Milner, 2005), possibly due to differences in 
cognitive load. Additionally, fear-related interference has not been observed in 
flanker tasks with relatively low levels of cognitive load (e.g., Venettacci, 
Johnstone, Kirkby, & Matthews, 2016). Given that ACT predicts anxiety is more 
likely to impair inhibitory control in the presence of threat distractors when task 
difficulty is greater (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), it was expected 
that high fear participants would exhibit fear-specific behavioural interference in the 
current paradigm where cognitive load had been targeted. However, this was not 
found. 
 However, there was an overall decline in accuracy and increase in RT and P1 
amplitude for go trials with incongruent relative to neutral flankers, irrespective of 
image. Thus, this more complex type of flanker may have received greater visual 
attention at an early stage of processing, resulting in greater interference in 
performance. This may reflect activation of the dorsal attentional system of the 
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orienting network, which can facilitate rapid top-down control of attention to 
prepare for expected input (Petersen & Posner, 2012). Further, the finding may be 
suggestive of a general, non-fear related interference in both groups. However, high 
fear participants showed an overall reduction in accuracy for go and nogo trials with 
incongruent flankers, suggesting this flanker type greater affected their performance 
compared to low fear participants. Differences in accuracy were not hypothesised as 
ACT suggests that anxiety should greater impair task efficiency, with a decrement in 
task effectiveness prevented through increased effort or compensatory strategies 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). The current findings therefore 
provides some support for a reduction in goal-directed attentional processing 
associated with disrupted inhibitory control in high fear individuals, albeit not in 
response to the fear-relevant distractors as expected.  
 A possible explanation for an absence of fear-specific behavioural 
interference in high fear participants may relate to the finding that high but not low 
fear participants showed increased N2 amplitude on incongruent trials with spider 
compared to flower flankers (for both go and nogo trials). This finding extends from 
a previous study using a flanker go nogo task where no N2 effects were observed in 
high spider fear participants (Venettacci, Johnstone, Kirkby, & Matthews, 2016), 
possibly due to a lack of cognitive load. However, the finding diverges from 
evidence of reduced nogo-N2 in clinical groups where impaired inhibitory control is 
thought to be characteristic (Kim, Kim, Yoo, & Kwon, 2007; Thomas, Gonsalvez, & 
Johnstone, 2014). While both groups in the current study had reduced accuracy on 
incongruent go and nogo trials for spider relative to flower flankers, greater N2 
amplitude on these trials for high fear participants may indicate they used more 
inhibitory resources to perform behaviourally at the same level as low fear 
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participants for these conditions. This may indicate use of a compensatory inhibitory 
process employed through the executive control network in high fear individuals 
which could have prevented fear-specific behavioural interference in the RT 
analysis.  
 While overall nogo trials had greater N2 amplitude, the difference in N2 for 
spider and flower flanker trials did not vary as a function of trial type. Therefore, the 
current findings do not represent nogo-N2 as predicted. It is possible that the finding 
instead represents an interference suppression mechanism, whereby high fear 
participants exerted more cognitive effort to resist interference from the spider 
distractors (Brydges et al., 2012). Interference suppression can modulate N2 
amplitude at the midline frontal site Fz, but with less amplitude, greater latencies, 
and more central distribution than nogo-N2 (Brydges et al., 2012). This mechanism 
likely involves resolving preparation of an incorrect response that arises from 
conflict induced by incongruent flankers (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). In the 
current study, the overall decline in accuracy for trials with spider flankers may 
suggest reduced ability to resolve conflict as both groups demonstrated a facilitated 
response to these stimuli when presented as targets on go trials. The N2 finding may 
then indicate greater use of inhibitory resources to resolve conflict for feared relative 
to neutral distractors among high fear participants.  
 Together, behavioural and electrophysiological findings provide some 
evidence for predictions made by ACT. Less accuracy for image incongruent trials 
in high fear participants may indicate a reduction in goal-directed attentional 
processing (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). However this was not 
specifically in response to spider distractors and is therefore not suggestive of a 
process relating to attentional bias to feared stimuli. The possibility that high fear 
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participants exerted more cognitive effort to suppress interference from spiders 
could be interpreted as evidence for ACT’s prediction that anxiety reduces the 
efficiency of inhibitory control when threat-distractors are present (Eysenck et al., 
2007). However, this is unexpected given the cognitive load added to this task, as 
ACT proposes it becomes harder for anxious individuals to use greater resources to 
sustain performance when task demands are greater (Eysenck et al., 2007). The 
finding is also not concurrent with under-recruitment of frontal regions in regulating 
attentional biases proposed by Bishop (2007). However, the findings may relate to 
failure to adequately elicit fear-related arousal in the high fear group, as discussed 
earlier.  
 The N2 finding should be interpreted with caution. The overall N2 
interaction only trended towards significance and the effect size for the high fear 
group was small in magnitude. Thus, future research should endeavour to replicate 
this finding before strong conclusions are drawn. If robust, the finding could inform 
directions for clinical treatment of specific fear/phobia. Attentional biases are one 
mechanism thought to be involved in impaired inhibitory learning (needed for 
successful extinction of fear) in individuals with an anxiety disorder due to 
inhibitory deficits (Craske, 2015; Craske, Liao, Brown, & Vervliet, 2012). 
Following attentional training away from threat, anxious individuals have shown 
increased N2 amplitude, suggesting improved inhibitory control (Eldar & Bar-Haim, 
2010). Accordingly, N2 amplitude may have utility as an electrophysiological means 
to quantifying increased efficiency of inhibitory control as attentional biases 
attenuate in specific fear. However, future research should first determine whether 
reduced inhibitory control is observed when attentional biases are present.  
 A potential threat to internal validity is the significantly higher psychological 
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distress scores in the high fear group. However, a preliminary ANCOVA was run 
with psychological distress entered as a covariate and revealed that this variable did 
not significantly relate to any of the dependent variables in any analysis. 
Additionally, it is argued that this analysis would not be appropriate given 
participants were not randomly allocated to groups, making it difficult to establish 
whether group differences at pre-test were attributable to random error or true group 
differences (Miller & Chapman, 2001). Given psychological distress is typical in 
anxiety-related disorders, it is unlikely to be partialled out independently of the 
effect of spider fear (Miller & Chapman, 2001). Future research with group 
differences in psychological characteristics could establish a clearer baseline of 
performance by including a behavioural pre-task free from spider stimuli.  
Summary and Conclusions  
 The present study investigated behavioural and electrophysiological 
correlates of hypervigilance and inhibitory control in specific fear using a flanker go 
nogo task which was modified to increase cognitive load. Both high and low fear 
groups demonstrated behavioural specific hypervigilance indexed by faster RTs to 
spider targets, suggestive of an evolutionary attentional mechanism. Specific 
hypervigilance was not evident in P1 data, with only a reduction in P1 amplitude 
observed in the left hemisphere for low fear participants, which may be indicative of 
less reliance on local visual processing compared to the high fear group. Fear-
specific behavioural interference did not surface specifically in high fear 
participants. While they exhibited less accuracy overall on incongruent image trials, 
a reduction in accuracy for trials with spider flankers was observed in both groups. 
Increased N2 amplitude on spider flanker trials for high fear participants may 
indicate the use of a compensatory inhibitory process to suppress interference from 
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irrelevant fear-related information.  
 While the current investigation sought to further examine the unique and 
interactive roles of hypervigilance and inhibitory control as potential mechanisms 
underlying attentional biases to feared stimuli in individuals with specific fear, no 
such biases were observed. Inconsistent with ACT (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & 
Calvo, 2007), there was an absence of increased automatic attentional processing to 
feared stimuli that was unique to high fear participants. Explanations for this include 
the possibility that fear was not sufficiently elicited in high fear participants and that 
the increased cognitive load with the current task disproportionally engaged 
voluntary processing, masking hypervigilance effects. Subsequently, the lack of 
hypervigilance might explain why high fear participants also did not show greater 
interference compared to low fear participants, or reduced inhibitory control, in 
response to spider distractors. Possibly, while requiring more cognitive effort, high 
fear participants were able to recruit the sufficient resources to prevent greater 
decrement to goal-directed attentional processing compared to low fear participants, 
when exposed to their feared object. This is a relatively novel finding of enhanced 
performance of the executive control attentional network (Petersen & Posner, 2012) 
in specific fear and while in line with ACT’s prediction that anxiety impairs the 
efficiency of inhibitory control, it does not extend the assumptions of ACT to show 
that this manifests in the form of an attentional bias towards feared stimuli in 
specific fear (Eysenck et al., 2007). However, as discussed, this finding needs 
replication. Additionally, the exact role of fear and the interaction between the 
orienting and executive control networks cannot be inferred from the current study. 
Future research should aim to further investigate this using paradigms better placed 
to elicit fear responses and engage both automatic and voluntary attentional 
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processing. This would help to ascertain whether increased automatic and decreased 
voluntary attentional processing takes place concurrently in specific fear, or whether 
they are observable only in isolation.  
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Appendix A 
Online Screening Questionnaire  
 
 
Screening Questionnaire 
Section 1 - Demographics 
1. Age __________________ 
2. Sex _________ 
3. Females only: 
Are you currently on the contraceptive pill? Yes / No 
Are you currently pregnant or breastfeeding? Yes / No 
Is there any possibility that you could be pregnant? Yes / No 
4. Is English your first language? Yes/no? 
 (if no please specify_________________) 
5.  Are you left or right handed? Right [1] Left [2]  
6. What grade of school did you complete? 
 Year_______ 
7. Have you completed any courses after school? 
 No…………………………….…0 
 Yes, trade/technical…...1 
 Yes, university………….…2 
 Specify qualifications___________________________ 
8. Are you currently studying? 
 No…………………………………0 
 Yes, trade/technical……….1 
 Yes, university……….…….. 2 
 Specify ___________________________ 
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Section 3 – Health and Medical History 
 
1. Have you ever suffered from any of the following: 
Epilepsy       Yes 
 No 
Severe head injury      Yes 
 No 
Diabetes       Yes 
 No 
Fits or convulsions (that were not related to a fever)  Yes 
 No 
Loss of consciousness (greater than 2 minutes)   Yes 
 No 
Concussion in last 6 weeks     Yes 
 No 
Regular Giddiness      Yes 
 No 
Heart condition or any other serious physical condition   Yes 
 No 
Sleep disorder (or any major sleeping difficulties)   Yes 
 No 
Visual problems (that are not fixed with glasses/contact lenses) Yes 
 No 
Hearing problems       Yes 
 No 
 
If you answered yes to any of the questions above, please provide some extra 
information on the condition (and the length of time and severity. 
 
2. Are you currently taking any prescribed medications? Yes / No 
If yes, please specify: 
.................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................... 
 
3.  Do you have sensitive skin? Yes / No 
(Skin preparation for EEG recording includes using alcohol wipes and exfoliant in 
order to get the best reading possible from electrodes, people with sensitive 
skin may find this irritating) 
 
Section 4 – Mental health 
 
1. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health condition? Yes / 
No 
If yes, please provide some extra information (including the condition and time frame):   
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Section 5 – Substance use 
The following questions are about your use of tobacco, alcohol and other substances 
 
1. In the last 6 months, how often have you used tobacco/nicotine? 
Never .................................................0 
Less than monthly ..............................1 
Monthly .............................................2 
Weekly ...............................................3 
Daily or almost daily ...........................4 
2. In the last 6 months, how often have you used illicit drugs (e.g., cannabis, ecstasy, speed)? 
Never .................................................0 
Less than monthly ..............................1 
Monthly .............................................2 
Weekly ...............................................3 
Daily or almost daily ...........................4 
3. On how many occasions have you ever used illicit drugs? 
None .................................................0 
1-5 ..............................1 
5-10 .............................................2 
10-15 ...............................................3 
More than 15 occasions ...........................4 
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Appendix B 
Ethics Approval Email 
 
 
Removed for confidentiality purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
  
 
Appendix C 
Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Spider Fear, Brain Activity, and Attention 
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research study into the effects of spider fear on 
attention during the viewing of spider images. This is an Honours study being 
conducted by Monique Williams and Tess Nikitenko under the supervision of Dr 
Allison Matthews (Chief Investigator, School of Medicine, Psychology). 
 
1. ‘What is the purpose of this study?’ 
The purpose is to investigate brain processes involved in attentional processing 
among males and females with high and low spider fear. 
 
2. ‘Why have I been invited to participate in this study?’ 
You are eligible to participate in this study because you have an intense fear of 
spiders or that you have a relatively low of fear spiders. 
 
4. ‘What does this study involve?’ 
This study will require you to attend one session (approximately 2 hours) at the 
University of Tasmania. In this session you will complete some questionnaires 
relating to your fear of spiders. You will then complete some computer tasks where 
you will respond (using a button press) to particular aspects of visual stimuli 
presented on a computer screen. These stimuli may include pictures, letters or 
objects (and may include pictures of spiders). Your brain activity will be measured 
while you complete these tasks.  
 
It is important that you understand that your involvement is this study is voluntary. 
While we would be pleased to have you participate, we respect your right to decline. 
There will be no consequences to you if you decide not to participate, and this will 
not affect your relationship with the University. If you decide to discontinue 
participation at any time, you may do so without providing an explanation. All 
information will be treated in a confidential manner, and your name will not be used 
in any publication arising out of the research. All of the research will be kept in a 
locked cabinet in the office of Dr Allison Matthews or on a secure server at the 
University of Tasmania. 
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5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
You may or may not experience anxiety during the course of the study. However, if 
you do, it is hoped that you will notice a reduction in your anxiety after a certain 
period of time. The results of this study will provide valuable information on the 
attentional processes involved in spider fear and will help us to further develop an 
online treatment program for people with phobias. 
6. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
If you experience anxiety during the study, this may be unpleasant and include 
emotions of fear and worrying thoughts, wishing to avoid the situation, physical 
discomforts such as palpitations, sweating and over-breathing. The researchers will 
provide you with information for dealing with these symptoms if they unduly 
trouble you. However, if you find that you are becoming distressed or experience 
significantly elevated levels of anxiety you will be advised to receive support from a 
clinician or alternatively, we will arrange for you to see a counsellor at no expense 
to you.. 
 
There are no specific risks associated with the measurement of brain activity. 
However, if you have sensitive skin there is a small possibility of a slight skin 
reaction from electrode preparation materials. If you believe there is a chance that 
your skin may react you are advised to reconsider participation.  
 
7. What if I have questions about this research? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study, or require further assistance 
with your fear of spiders after the study is completed, please feel free to contact Dr 
Allison Matthews on ph (03) 62267236, who would be happy to discuss any aspect 
of the research with you. Once we have analysed the information we will be putting 
a summary of our findings on the School of Psychology website for you to view. 
You are welcome to contact us at that time to discuss any issue relating to the 
research study. 
 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human Research 
Ethics Committee.  If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this 
study should contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on 
(03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. You will need to 
quote [H0011104]. 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. If you wish to take part in 
it, please sign the attached consent form. This information sheet is for you to 
keep. 
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Chief Investigator: Dr Allison Matthews 
Student Investigators: Monique Williams and Tess Nikitenko 
CONSENT FORM 
Spider Fear, Brain Activity, and Attention 
  
1. I have read and understood the 'Information Sheet' for this project. 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that the study involves attending one session (approx. 2 hours) at the 
University of Tasmania whereby I will complete some questionnaires and some 
computer based attention tasks. These tasks may involve responding to pictures 
(including spiders), letters, or objects and brain activity will be monitored 
throughout the process.  
4. I understand that participation involves some risk of experiencing a heightened 
level of anxiety; however, the researcher will be present at all times, I will be given 
information on how to cope with anxiety, and I will be referred to a counsellor if 
need be. I understand that measurement of brain activity involves minimal risk, 
and slight skin irritation may occur if I have sensitive skin. 
5. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania premises for ten years and will then be destroyed. 
6. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
7. I agree that research data gathered from me for the study may be published 
provided that I cannot be identified as a participant.  
8. I understand that the researchers will maintain my identity confidential and that 
any information I supply to the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes of 
the research.  
9. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may withdraw at 
any time without any effect, and if I so wish, may request that any data I have 
supplied to date be withdrawn from the research. 
  
Name of Participant: 
Signature: Date: 
 
Statement by Investigator 
 
 I have explained the project & the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and I believe 
that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation  
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, 
the following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided so 
participants have the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in this project. 
Name of Investigator  
Signature of Investigator  
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Appendix D  
Experimental Questionnaire 
Date ____/____/____       
 Participant ID ____________ 
1. Check that participant has abstained from alcohol for 24 hours and illicit drug use 
since completing the screening questionnaire 
3. How many cups of coffee (or any other caffeinated drinks/products) have you 
consumed today? _____  
If > 0. How many hours since your last caffeinated drink ______ hours 
4. Have you had any tobacco or nicotine products today? Yes / No  
If yes, how many cigarettes (or nicotine products) have you had today? ____ 
If yes, How many hours since your last cigarette (nicotine product) ______ hours 
5.  Have you consumed any medications in the past week (or any prescribed 
medications since completing the screening questionnaire)? 
If yes, please detail:  
 
6. Approximately how many hours sleep did you have last night? ____ 
Karolinska sleepiness scale (participant can self-complete) 
Please circle on the following scale of 1 to 9 how you feel AT THE PRESENT MOMENT: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Very 
alert 
 Alert – 
normal 
level 
 Neither 
alert nor 
sleepy 
 Sleepy – 
but no 
effort to 
stay 
awake 
 Very 
sleepy, 
great 
effort to 
stay 
awake, 
fighting 
 
  
Medication Number of 
occasions 
Time since last used Estimated dose 
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Appendix E 
Participant Video Gaming Experience Questionnaire 
 
Date: ___________________                                     Participant: __________ 
Video Gaming Experience Questionnaire 
 
We are interested in how often you play video games, and may use this 
information to examine the effects of video game playing on visual 
attention and motor skills.  
 
How often would you normally play video games? Please choose one 
response.  
 
Never play video games  
Rarely play video games (less than 2 hours a month)  
Occasionally play video games (between 30 minutes and 2 hours a week)  
Regularly play video games (between 2 hours and 5 hours a week)  
Often play video games (more than 5 hours a week) 
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Appendix F 
Non-Significant and Non-Theoretically F-Statistics 
Table F1 
F Statistics for Non-significant and Non-theoretically Relevant Effects in Accuracy, 
Reaction Time and P1 Amplitude Analyses for Go Stimuli 
Effect F-test 
Accuracy (% correct)  
Group F(1,28)=3.00, p=.094, ηp
2=.097 
Target image F(1,28)=3.42, p=.075, ηp
2=.109 
Group x Flanker type F(1,28)=1.14, p=.296, ηp
2=.039 
Group x Target image F(1,28)=.017, p=.896, ηp
2=.001 
Flanker type x Target image F(1,28)=1.92, p=.177, ηp
2=.064 
Group x Flanker type x Target image F(1,28)=1.03, p=.318, ηp
2=.036 
Reaction Time (ms)  
Group F(1,28)=2.26, p=.144, ηp
2=.075 
Group x Flanker type F(1,28)=.002, p=.967, ηp
2<.001 
Target image x Flanker type F(1,28)=0.92, p=.346, ηp
2=.032 
Pl amplitude  
Hemisphere F(1,28)=0.86, p=.363, ηp
2=.030 
Flanker type x Group F(1,28)=0.01, p=.921, ηp
2<.001 
Flanker type x Target image F(1,28)=0.01, p=.914, ηp
2<.001 
Flanker type x Hemisphere F(1,28)=0.07, p=.789, ηp
2=.003 
Target image x Hemisphere  F(1,28)=0.03, p=.864, ηp
2=.001 
Group x Target image x Flanker type F(1,28)=0.34, p=.567, ηp
2=.012 
Group x Target image x Hemisphere F(1,28)=0.30, p=.590, ηp
2=.010 
Group x Flanker type x Hemisphere F(1,28)=0.47, p=.500, ηp
2=.016 
Target image x Flanker type x Hemisphere F(1,28)=2.57, p=.120, ηp
2=.084 
Target image x Flanker type x Hemisphere x Group F(1,28)=0.74, p=.398, ηp
2=.026 
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Table F2 
F Statistics for Non-significant and Non-theoretically Relevant Effects in Accuracy 
and N2 Amplitude Analyses for Incongruent Image Go and Nogo Stimuli 
Effect F Statistic 
Accuracy (% correct)  
Group x Flanker image F(1,28)=0.11, p=.748, ηp2=.004 
Group x Trial F(1,28)=2.19, p=.150, ηp2=.072 
Flanker image x Trial F(1,28)=3.68, p=.065, ηp2=.116 
Flanker image x Trial x Group F(1,28)=0.33, p=.570, ηp2=.012 
Peak N2 Amplitude (μV)  
Group F(1,28)=0.71, p=.405, ηp2=.025 
Flanker image F(1,28)=0.71, p=.405, ηp2=.025 
Group x Trial  F(1,28)=1.04, p=.318, ηp2=.036 
Flanker image x Trial  F(1,28)=0.02, p=.893, ηp2=.001 
 
